Bezirke on Scale: Regional and Local Actors in East German 'Democratic Centralism' by Kuhl, Lena & Werner, Oliver
www.ssoar.info
Bezirke on Scale: Regional and Local Actors in East
German 'Democratic Centralism'
Kuhl, Lena; Werner, Oliver
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kuhl, L., & Werner, O. (2017). Bezirke on Scale: Regional and Local Actors in East German 'Democratic Centralism'.
Historical Social Research, 42(2), 243-266. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.42.2017.2.243-266
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51886-3
Historical Social Research 42 (2017) 2, 243-266 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.2.243-266 
Bezirke on Scale. Regional and Local Actors in East 
German ‘Democratic Centralism’ 
Lena Kuhl & Oliver Werner ∗ 
Abstract: »Bezirke on scale. Regionale und lokale Akteure im ostdeutschen 'de-
mokratischen Zentralismus‘«. The article examines the potential of the scale ap-
proach in the analysis of the former socialist dictatorships in Middle- and Middle-
East-Europe based on the case of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Obvi-
ously, the communist claim to power always relied on highly centralised chains of 
command. Nevertheless, regional state functionaries were occasionally able to 
realize their specific interests by scalar strategies like forming horizontal alliances 
or ‘jumping’ over the official channels through vertical personal networks. Focus-
sing on processes with different patterns of top-down- and bottom-up-
interactions, the scale approach reveals the fragile construction of the GDR’s 
‘Democratic Centralism’: By taking responsibility for regional or local interests 
and trying to streamline them with central politics, state functionaries at the 
same time stabilized and undermined the political system. Despite gaining tempo-
rary leeway for acting in their own interests, regional and local authorities re-
mained bound to the directives from the central leadership till the end of the 
GDR in 1989/90. 
Keywords: Politics of scale, regional planning, regional government, local gov-
ernment, dynamics of administration, GDR. 
1.  Introduction1 
Research on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has paid little attention 
to the role of so-called Bezirke and subordinate districts (Kreise) as regional 
and local actors. In 1995, Gero Neugebauer summed up the state of the art by 
noting that Bezirke and Kreise “had no history of their own” and “could be 
grasped only as part of the history of the larger state apparatus” (Neugebauer 
1995, 537). More recent studies have not revised this interpretation. Instead, it 
has endured and at times led to further confusion. Veit Scheller, for example, 
characterised campaigns of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) to 
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mobilise East German workers as a form of “grassroots statesmanship” (Schel-
ler 2009, 82). 
This instrumentalist perspective matches the GDR’s view of the administra-
tions of the Bezirke and Kreise as “regional bodies of state control” responsible 
for implementing the national economic plan. This understanding encompassed 
the belief that these administrations ought to articulate their interests in ways 
that correspond to state directives (Staatsrecht 1977, 395-401). A “unity of 
interests” was proclaimed. 
Today, it is well known that dictatorships never constitute monolithic enti-
ties and that a centralised system of rule must continuously reassert and renego-
tiate centralised power. This insight has been gained from the past two decades 
of research into German National Socialism in particular. Yet thus far, this 
insight has not been heeded in studies of East Germany’s system of rule and 
planning (John 2007; Lindenberger 1999). This article discusses the limits to 
East Germany’s dictatorship, the vertical integration of state levels, as well as 
the influence exerted by the model of state socialist rule on the organisation of 
the state and territory, and on the relationship between the central state and 
inferior levels (Lobao 2009). This attention to scalar strategies within East 
Germany’s centralised system of rule sheds light on mechanisms that resulted 
out of regional and local actors’ administrative practices which lent precarious 
stability to the system in the medium-term. This perspective complements 
analyses of socialist reform dynamics by adding a spatial dimension, thereby 
producing a more nuanced assessment that accounts both for the commonly 
diagnosed inability to undertake reforms and also for the system’s conspicuous 
accomplishments, for instance in the housing sector. 
This article discusses the significance of scalar strategies for the spatial or-
ganisation of East German state socialism by drawing on the examples of cen-
trally initiated plans, programmes, and local strategies. Specifically, this con-
tribution illustrates both top-down and bottom-up processes by examining 
instances of economic planning, the “Construction work in Berlin by the Be-
zirke” (Bezirke bauen in Berlin) programme, the political instrument of munic-
ipal associations (Gemeindeverbände), and the widespread phenomenon of 
illicit construction work (Schwarzbauten). These four fields of regional and 
local decision-making provide a nuanced picture of the way in which various 
different levels of East Germany’s administration (co)operated. This novel 
historical account of East Germany’s administrative practices also ties into 
debates over and analyses of ‘spaces of engagement’ and ‘politics of scales.’ 
2.  Centrally Initiated and Organised Processes 
In the centralised planning system of East Germany, decision-making was 
principally based on the state’s overall goals, which were defined and refined 
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by high-ranking party and administrative authorities. At any given time, state 
goals could be afforded priority over other binding decisions, forcing decision-
makers on the level of Bezirke, Kreise or cities to comply, if, for instance it had 
been decided that additional housing stock needed to be built in East Berlin. 
Warnings by regional party officials that ministries should “not override local 
decision-making bodies” did nothing to change the system. Subordinate institu-
tions had to draw on informal means to make up for such interventions.2 Deci-
sion-makers on the Kreis, municipal (Gemeinde) and city level could never be 
sure if their interests were being taken into consideration. 
The SED leadership only recognised regional interests directly linked to the 
GDR’s central economic plan. As early as the late 1940s, it postulated that 
federal state (Länder) and municipal (Gemeinde) administrations held a unique 
responsibility for improving economic matters and supply situations in their 
respective realms in accordance to the economic plan, albeit without assistance 
from central leadership (Aufgaben 1948). Central party and state bodies re-
ferred to this as the “mobilisation of regional reserves.” In early spring 1951, 
Bruno Leuschner, head of the state planning commission, declared that this 
represented a key responsibility of subordinate administrative levels 
(Leuschner 1951). 
Hopes that mobilising regional reserves would take pressure off central 
leadership and yield additional resources were also tied to the dissolution of the 
inherited federal state structure, and the creation of a new system of Bezirke 
and Kreise in its place. GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl, for instance, 
expected in August 1952 that “dissolving the structure will free resources 
needed to strengthen the state” (Werner 2017, 152). Indeed, personnel and mate-
rial resources in particular, were desperately needed to achieve the ambitious 
goals set forth in the first five-year economic plan which was valid until 1955. 
The plan stipulated that Bezirk Frankfurt (Oder) would become East Germany’s 
industrial centre, while Bezirk Cottbus would become an energy hub. These 
regional investment foci were to be organised and supported by the entire East 
German state. These mammoth tasks placed an extraordinary strain on the admin-
istrations of the newly established Bezirke and Kreise. The limited ability of East 
Germany’s political system to reflect upon and evaluate itself, and its unwilling-
ness to alter its power structure, initially prevented “regional bodies” from adapt-
ing to these administrative and economic demands (Kornai 1992). 
The SED leadership began initiating comprehensive reforms only after the 
erection of the inner German border wall in August 1961. Until 1965, new 
regulations were introduced in the context of the “New Economic System” 
(Neues Ökonomisches System) which seemed to grant more autonomy to the 
Bezirke. Early drafts of a respective decree were however criticised by the 
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SED’s first secretary Walter Ulbricht for granting too much democratic self-
determination and neglecting the element of centralism. Leadership, in his 
opinion, was always a top-down affair.3 As such, the final decree, published in 
1965, granted very little autonomy (Gesetzblatt der DDR 1965). Institutions 
like the “Bureau for Territorial Planning” (Büros für Territorialplanung) 
emerged out of regional, urban, and village planning bureaus and assumed 
responsibility for spatial and infrastructural planning. This meant a considera-
ble concentration of planning expertise on the level of Bezirke. The bureau’s 
administrative competences remained ill-defined, however, allowing central 
leadership to intervene at will and putting economic goals first. 
Party and state leadership granted a certain degree of regional autonomy 
with specific expectations in mind. Specifically, its relationship vis-a-vis sub-
ordinate administrative tiers was linked to the expectation that this would yield 
additional resources. At all times, decision-makers on the level of Bezirke and 
Kreise were bound the state’s overall economic plan. There existed no depend-
able, official way to have regional interests recognised unless these were direct-
ly connected to the economic plan. 
By the 1960s, the SED leadership had achieved its most important objective, 
namely to install functionaries on the level of the Bezirke, Kreise, and cities 
who had fully accepted the unquestioned priority of central directives. This 
meant that even supposedly unambiguous terms like “self-responsibility” were 
no longer understood by subordinate party and state functionaries to imply 
genuine autonomy. Instead, they understood such terms to mean regional and 
local efforts to “use independent thinking, initiative, and all available forces 
and resources available in the territory to meet state goals” (Böhme 1969, 115). 
2.1 “Complex Consultations” on Economic Planning 
(Komplexberatungen) 
Central decision-makers welcomed the fact that loyal functionaries were now 
installed on the level of Bezirke and Kreise. This represented an opportunity to 
increasingly involve them in planning processes. 
The state planning commission (Staatliche Plankommission or SPK) had 
begun in the mid-1960s to sporadically consult representatives from the Bezirke 
with regard to the planning of large-scale projects. This was sensible from a 
technological perspective, and even more so from one of political power, as 
representatives from the Bezirke had to justify levels of investment to the 
Kreise.4 Moreover, the head of the SPK observed that “many Bezirke and or-
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Erdöl-Chemiekombinates und seiner Folgemaßnahmen“ from August 1963, presented to the 
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ganisations are under the illusion that the GDR has at its disposal an abundance 
of funds for investment” and that regional functionaries should therefore “vig-
orously confront these subjective [meaning: inaccurate] beliefs prevalent 
among several architects and functionaries.”5 
These consultations soon became regular complex consultations on the Be-
zirk level in which responsible actors from the central government, regional 
administrations, and combine directors negotiated the respective territorial part 
of the national economic plan. In establishing new procedures, it was common 
practice to select a Bezirk and to generalise from experiences gained there. In 
mid-May 1966, complex consultations were held in Bezirk Cottbus from which 
the SPK derived binding “conclusions […] for ensuring uniform developments 
in different branches and territories.” The SPK demanded that future talks 
“begin with increasing the efficiency of centrally and regionally directed con-
struction efforts,” as “construction efforts by the Bezirke do not match econom-
ic requirements and existing capacities.” The SPK apparently considered such 
talks an effective means of revealing instances where Bezirke displayed “inad-
equate planning and management of construction efforts” or an “inappropriate-
ly generous use of investment funds.”6 
It soon transpired, however, that talks with representatives from the Bezirke 
concerning the feasibility of realising certain large-scale projects could also 
impact planning by party and state leaders. Regional representatives, for in-
stance, repeatedly criticised the sluggish “balancing of resources available 
throughout the state” which, depending on the respective branch, lay in the 
responsibility of the central ministries for industry.7 Such comments resulted in 
the need for novel coordination efforts, forcing central institutions to adapt 
accordingly. They also lead to checks by centrally coordinated task forces to 
assess whether untapped regional ‘reserves’ existed in order to prevent future 
interventions by the regions.8 
By the early 1970s, these talks evolved into regularly held complex consul-
tations involving all Bezirke, granting regional functionaries and industrial 
                                                                                                                                
GDR government by Harry Mönch, Chairman of the Bezirk Council Frankfurt (Oder) (ibid., 
DE 1/48293). 
5  Erich Apel on July 2, 1964 at the „Beratung der Kommission des Politbüros des ZK der SED 
und des Ministerrates der DDR zur Ausarbeitung des Perspektivplanes bis 1970“ (ibid., 
DE 1/49278, 26). 
6  „Schlussfolgerungen aus der komplexen Beratung in Cottbus am 16.5.1966 für die Vorberei-
tung und Durchführung komplexer Beratungen in wichtigen Bezirken zur Sicherung der 
Übereinstimmung der Entwicklung der Zweige und Territorien,“ May 23, 1966 (ibid., 
DE 1/53064, 2-4). 
7  Information provided by the SPK’s department for territorial planning “regarding the organ-
isation of the complex talks,” September 8, 1966 (ibid., 31). 
8  Minutes prepared for talks between the SPK Chairman with ministers and representatives 
from Bezirk Magdeburg “to clarify problems regarding construction work as decided by the 
Council of Ministers,” June 12, 1966 (ibid.). 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  248 
combine representatives a formal say in the drafting of the annual economic 
plans. At the same time, the Bezirke’s administrations were urged to “mobilise 
output and efficiency reserves in order to fulfil and to exceed state targets” 
(Kinz 1989, 335). In actuality, agreements reached in these talks were often 
undermined through spontaneous but economically sound changes to the eco-
nomic plan. The complex consultations nevertheless provided informal chan-
nels for representatives of the Bezirke to secure certain benefits for their Bezirk 
from East German decision-makers. 
Functionaries who had represented their Bezirk in such complex consulta-
tions recall the intensity and tensions: “It was nerve-racking each time!” 
(Münch 2000, 332). Those able to stand their ground could call for the modifi-
cation of state targets by referring to resource scarcity in the Bezirk.9 This, 
however, required that representatives from the Bezirke engage in a delicate 
balancing act whereby they would call for modifications of the economic plan, 
point to ‘regional reserves,’ and simultaneously display a fundamental respect 
for the central economic plan. If they failed to achieve this balancing act, if 
planned investments were too important, or if an example had to be made of a 
Bezirk, agreed targets could be radically increased by superior institutions. 
After East Germany’s leadership for instance decided to curb illicit con-
struction work in April 197810 it underscored this decision by making an exam-
ple of Bezirk Magdeburg. First secretary of Magdeburg’s SED Bezirk admin-
istration had declared, somewhat thoughtlessly, that “no unlicensed 
construction work exists in the Bezirk.” A task force, headed by SPK Chairman 
Günter Mittag, was deployed by East Germany’s leadership and quickly refut-
ed this claim and in turn accused functionaries in Bezirk Magdeburg of “lack-
ing the necessary in-depth and broad overview of and grasp on economic pro-
cesses and problems.”11 The task force revealed that materials had been wasted 
and that “substantial efficiency reserves” existed in Bezirk Magdeburg, which 
could be utilised to meet economic targets set forth in the central plan. This 
made it impossible for representatives of Bezirk Magdeburg to request a lower-
ing of state targets in the subsequent round of complex consultations, which 
were repeated under the auspices of the task force, with Mittag stating that 
these complex consultations were a “state-wide affair” and an “instrument” to 
“better realise the principle of democratic centralism.”12 
                                                             
9  Verbal statements by former deputy secretary of the SED administration of Bezirk Berlin, 
Helmut Müller, and by former secretary for construction of the SED administration of Bezirk 
Berlin, Gerhard Poser, on October 17, 2013. 
10  Decision by the GDR government about „Ergebnisse der Kontrolle zur Einhaltung der Be-
schlüsse und gesetzlichen Bestimmungen bei Initiativvorhaben durch die Räte der Bezirke 
und Kreise,“ April 13, 1978 (Bundesarchiv, DC 20/I-3/1482). 
11  Report of the Magdeburg task force, appendix to minutes produced for the politburo meet-
ing on January 30, 1979 (ibid., DY 30 /J IV 2/2/1763, 22). 
12  Ibid., 31 and 75. 
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GDR party and state leaders were entitled to rescind agreements made with 
the Bezirke at any given moment, thus undermining the possibility for regions 
to effectively represent their interests at the complex consultations. While some 
regional representatives were occasionally able to assert their particular inter-
ests, the complex consultations nevertheless never acquired sufficient momen-
tum to permanently alter the relationship between local, regional, and central 
institutions. 
2.2  The Campaign “Construction work in Berlin by the Bezirke” 
(Bezirke bauen in Berlin) 
East Germany’s leadership would curtail the vertical devolution of power, and 
the potential autonomy of regional and local actors, depending on the signifi-
cance of its political or economic objectives. This becomes apparent in the 
context of the “Construction work in Berlin by the Bezirke” programme which 
obliged all East German Bezirke to build housing stock in East Berlin. In this 
context, the GDR leadership pursued an uncompromising top-down strategy, 
backed with leverage vis-a-vis state and party functionaries in the Bezirke. 
Since the 1960s, Berlin’s construction sector had been able to meet targets 
set forth by GDR planners by deploying ad hoc measures, drawing on other 
region’s resources. Such measures were never deployed as part of a compre-
hensive campaign, however. Occasionally and for limited durations only, re-
sources were also diverted from East Berlin to support large investment pro-
jects in other Bezirke, such as the major building sites Eisenhüttenstadt and 
Schwedt in the Bezirk Frankfurt (Oder).13 
2.2.1   The Programme 
In the summer of 1973, a comprehensive decision by the politburo and a new 
law expanded the duties of the Bezirke’s construction sector concerning the 
SED’s “housing construction programme” (Gesetzblatt der DDR 1973). Since 
its inception, the programme ensured that the GDR capital of East Berlin en-
joyed preferential treatment regarding the allocation of building materials. It 
soon advanced to become the symbolic centre piece of Erich Honecker’s policy 
of “economic and social unity,” posing an unprecedented challenge for regional 
decision-makers and placing a strain on efforts to mobilise construction re-
sources.14 A subsequent politburo decision in early 1976 further emphasised 
East Berlin’s unique status, stressing that its development is “of special im-
                                                             
13  Verbal statement by Harry Mönch, who chaired Bezirk Council Frankfurt (Oder) between 
1963 and 1969, on April 4, 2014. 
14  „Entwicklung des komplexen Wohnungsbaus für die Jahre 1976 bis 1980 und Konzeption 
zur Errichtung des Palastes der Republik in der Hauptstadt der DDR,“ decision by the polit-
buro on March 27, 1973 (Bundesarchiv, DY 30 /J IV 2/2/1440, 14-45). 
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portance for shaping the developed socialist society of the GDR.”15 This deci-
sion was allegedly reached with “active participation from central and regional 
state bodies” which should underscore “that developing the capital into a socialist 
metropolis lies in the responsibility of the entire republic” and that “all Bezirke 
are providing support to realise this endeavour” (Morgenstern 1981, 93). 
To guarantee this ‘support,’ it was decided by the early 1970s that “im-
portant investments in industrial construction and other areas pertaining to the 
Bezirke would be postponed until an undetermined date ‘after 1975’ in order to 
support the ‘development of the capital city’.” Skilled engineers were “deliber-
ately settled” in East Berlin and “construction combines situated in other Be-
zirke […] obliged to undertake a specific number of construction projects in a 
certain time period” in the GDR capital (Palutzki 2000, 304). 
Moving resources from the Bezirke to the capital and trying to compensate 
for this loss caused major problems. Even greater problems resulted from the 
procedures applied to divert workers and building materials to East Berlin. 
Arbitrarily raised construction targets and a persistent uncertainty whether 
regional and local interests were respected, placed a permanent strain on the 
relationship between the administrations of Bezirke and Kreise and the SED 
leadership. 
Representatives from the Bezirke’s planning commissions had suggested 
during the programme’s implementation phase that resources diverted to East 
Berlin should also be tied a reallocation of investment funds from the industrial 
sector to the maintenance of infrastructure within the Bezirke. This suggestion 
was, however, rejected by the SED leadership which had decided to raise tar-
gets for industrial construction.16 This meant in effect that the Bezirke’s admin-
istrations were granted no additional powers whatsoever to regulate the outflow 
of building resources from their Bezirke to East Berlin. They, in turn, had to 
pass the resultant resource scarcity on to the subordinate Kreise and had to 
accept the strict allocation of investments and the subsequent exacerbation of 
problems in the Bezirke. 
In spring 1977, the Bezirke’s targets for undertaking construction work in 
East Berlin were further specified. It had been decided that until 1980 East 
Berlin should receive “over 15 billion marks worth of construction work, of 
which 4,4 billion marks worth of construction work will be contributed from 
collectives from the Bezirke and centrally coordinated construction combines.” 
This investment sum encompassed not only housing construction but also 
“necessary construction work in Berlin’s industrial sector, in transportation and 
                                                             
15  „Aufgaben zur Entwicklung der Hauptstadt der DDR, Berlin, bis 1990,“ decision by the 
politburo on February 3, 1976 (ibid., DY 30 /J IV 2/2/1602, 30). 
16  „Entwicklung des komplexen Wohnungsbaus für die Jahre 1976 bis 1980 und Konzeption 
zur Errichtung des Palastes der Republik in der Hauptstadt der DDR,“ decision by the polit-
buro on March 27, 1973 (ibid., DY 30 /J IV 2/2/1440, 23). 
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infrastructural improvements” (5. Tagung 1977, 98). Thus, East Berlin was to 
profit from those exact resources that were denied to the Bezirke. This was 
justified with the capital’s unique status, entitling it to preferential treatment. 
2.2.2  Consequences 
East Berlin’s preferential treatment vis-a-vis the Bezirke soon also found ex-
pression in institutional arrangements. East Berlin’s city council (Magistrat), 
was to coordinate the Bezirke’s building efforts in the city. In the mid-1980s 
the city council established a coordination task force to institutionalise a chan-
nel of communication with representatives from the Bezirke. The task force 
closely cooperated with the GDR ministry for construction to clarify all details 
and to denounce to the higher authorities those Bezirke which had failed to 
meet their respective construction quotas.17 
There was no way for the Bezirke not to comply with these political, admin-
istrative, and technological demands. So they agreed to provide building re-
sources, yet passed this responsibility downwards onto the Kreise. This largely 
robbed the latter of the means to engage in construction or modernisation ef-
forts of their own, causing small towns and urban quarters in the provinces to 
fall into disrepair. This imbalance strained the relationship between East Ger-
many’s regions and the capital in the mid-term, overshadowing ritualistic refer-
ences to the “vigour of the entire republic” which, supposedly, was manifested 
in the development of East Berlin. 
A fierce conflict in the late 1980s between the Berlin based SED leadership 
and SED administrators in Dresden illustrates how severely mere mentions of 
regional construction needs were punished. In January 1989 Hans Modrow, 
first secretary of Dresden’s SED leadership, pointed out the dire housing situa-
tion within his Bezirk, requesting a reduction of Dresden’s contributions to 
building efforts in Berlin. This resulted in discussions and the dispatching of a 
task force to Dresden by the SED’s central committee to investigate the ‘caus-
es’ of the housing situation. The task force then published a report and the 
Bezirk’s leadership was summoned to Berlin and harshly reprimanded (Nie-
mann 2007, 325-36). 
This example illustrates how little freedom Bezirke were granted by the 
GDR leadership regarding construction efforts in East Berlin. This had a detri-
mental effect on East German regions. Wolfgang Junker, who acted as the 
minister for construction at the time and thus held partial responsibility for this 
situation, admitted on November 9, 1989 (the day the Berlin wall fell) that in 
hindsight requiring “Bezirke to engage in such intense and prolonged building 
efforts in Berlin […] was a mistake.” This excessive strain on resources had 
                                                             
17  Minutes produced for talks of the Arbeitsgruppe Gesamtkoordinierung (Landesarchiv Berlin, 
C Rep. 110-08/15). 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  252 
“undermined plans for urban development in many cities.” A “core problem,” 
according to Junker, consisted in the leadership’s view on “the construction 
sector in the Kreise as a permanent reserve […], which could be exploited any 
time investments in complex housing or the industrial sector were behind 
schedule, or when the budget needed balancing.” This attitude had “greatly 
undermined the population’s trust in assurances made by regional councils” 
(Hertle 2012, 255-6). 
Nevertheless, this account by a high-ranking functionary must not tempt 
readers to assume that the endeavour to undertake wide-ranging construction 
work in East Berlin was at any time ever seriously questioned. Instead, what 
this period illustrates is the simultaneity of construction efforts, the erosion of 
regional resources, and of administrative ties. The marginalisation of East 
German regions and disappointing planning outcomes significantly contributed 
to the collapse of the GDR. 
3.  Local Practices 
In East Germany’s hierarchically organised system, cities, districts (Kreise) and 
municipalities (Gemeinden) faced very different contexts. The formal status of 
a municipality played a decisive role. A municipality that was subordinate to its 
Kreis could not, for instance, attract sufficient attention and labour force for its 
projects, whereas capitals of the Bezirke and independent cities were able to 
draw from their self-administered resources. There were a number of towns of 
political or economic importance that grew and benefited from exceptional 
funding. Yet over ninety percent of municipalities experienced above average 
demographic shrinkage (Ostwald 1989, 124; cf. Kress 2008, 237-77). The fact 
that investments were concentrated on certain focal points exacerbated inequal-
ities. In general, mid-sized towns and large cities displayed above average 
growth. Workers and young families moved to industrial centres where jobs 
and newly built apartments were provided for them, while the elderly remained 
in inner cities and rural settlements. Here, shrinkage and urban decay were 
widespread. Socio-spatial inequalities in the GDR were said to derive from the 
historical development of bourgeois society. Paradoxically, when centrally 
planned programmes coordinated urbanisation processes in the GDR, new 
spatial disparities resulted (Bernhardt 2006). 
After an initial period of structural and industrial programmes, under the 
rule of Erich Honecker, socio-political factors became the prime focus of terri-
torial and city planning. After twenty years, immediate improvements had to be 
made. In 1973, the residential construction programme promoted the unity of 
industrial construction, on the one hand, and the maintenance of existing histor-
ic buildings, on the other. Notions of concentration and rationalisation put an 
end to the extensive programmes of the 1950s and 1960s (Boenisch 1982; Kind 
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1997; Kuhl 2015). The political leadership intended a new concept of territorial 
planning, a re-orientation in terms of urban development and housing construc-
tion, and a re-organisation of communal politics to improve the quality of life 
and housing throughout the GDR. The housing programme focused not only on 
East Berlin but rather sought to raise standards of living throughout the entire 
GDR, thus targeting all Kreise and municipalities. This seemed to be good 
news for small towns that so far had not benefited from state planning. 
3.1  Growing Importance of the Regional Level 
In the 1970s, settlement patterns that had evolved historically and existing 
buildings were considered crucial resources of and starting points for future 
structural planning (Urban 2010). Likewise, preserving and modernising the 
built environment was deemed relevant in rural settlements and inner city quar-
ters, in which barely any new construction work was being undertaken. Territo-
rial and state planning institutions hoped that a decentralised settlement pattern 
and strengthened links between urban centres and their surroundings would 
produce nationwide improvements. Nevertheless, most investments remained 
earmarked for the centres of the respective Bezirke. The new concept explicitly 
rejected maintaining and developing small-scale settlements, judging this to be 
uneconomical (Ostwald 1975). 
The onus of development work was placed on Bezirke, Kreise and munici-
palities: On the one hand, they held responsibility for building settlements 
according to the plan. On the other hand, politicians, planners, and administra-
tors could not one-sidedly focus on urban centres alone and were tasked with 
managing the entire territory, including those regions neglected by territorial 
planning programmes. Large building combines (Wohnungsbaukombinate) on 
the regional level were specialised in industrial construction techniques to be 
utilised in new development areas out in the open country. Conservation and 
maintenance in the inner cities were the principal task of small Kreis building 
companies. Yet after neglecting maintenance work for decades, they were 
completely overwhelmed by these obligations and unable to meet the new local 
and regional needs. 
Since the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, central initiatives tried fostering 
local initiatives to compensate for a lack of resources. Municipalities were 
obliged to get crafts, small-scale trade and commerce involved in the construc-
tion sector, and to foster (private) local initiatives to engage in the field of 
renovation, repair, and maintenance as well as in the construction of private 
residences. During this time in particular, a compensatory function was as-
cribed to the local level. Municipalities were to encourage the local population 
to develop their own initiatives and to take an active part in the ‘socialist de-
mocracy.’ In addition to mobilising local support for state duties, the GDR 
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leadership sought to foster so-called territorial rationalisation though its pro-
grammes. 
The concept that improvements ought to be made without using additional 
resources was hence turned into official policy. The state pursued a scalar tactic 
to delegate responsibility by re-structuring municipal politics. 
3.2  Municipal Associations (Gemeindeverbände) 
The establishment of the new GDR administrative structure in 1952 was ac-
companied by a political discourse championing the empowerment of regional 
and local bodies. The state leadership initiated numerous campaigns and re-
forms to improve the work of the administration. The aim was to grant regional 
and local bodies greater freedom in organising developments within their re-
spective realms and for them to implement central directives more efficiently 
and in a self-responsible way. 
An example for this were moves to strengthen municipal associations, which 
brought together numerous small municipalities caught up in precarious cir-
cumstances, with the intention of enabling them to effectively fulfil their re-
spective duties. In 1974, the GDR Council of Ministers (Ministerrat der DDR) 
introduced municipal associations as a novel instrument for organising politico-
municipal affairs, given that the GDR was made up of many small and shrink-
ing municipalities at the time (Püttner 1997, 222).18 Unlike West Germany, 
which reorganised local governance structures on a large scale, East Germany 
pursued a different approach. Beginning in the 1960s, it began fostering coop-
eration among municipalities, allowing them to fulfil their respective duties. 
This “socialist cooperation” (sozialistische Zusammenarbeit) was regarded as 
an evolution in socialist democracy and as a means to better tackle and “im-
plement the municipalities’ and economic goals” (Gesetzblatt der DDR 1985). 
Various different formats were chosen to pursue this approach: contracts were 
agreed upon between municipalities and local cooperatives, “purpose-oriented 
associations” (Zweckverbände) with clearly defined targets were established, as 
were municipal associations for the purpose of broad, long-term cooperation. 
The East German law from July 12, 1973 on local representation and related 
bodies decreed that the local level should address a broad spectrum of tasks 
pertaining to municipalities. Among these: fostering settlement policy, industry 
and agriculture, and “improving living and supply situations, repair, and other 
services, as well as cultural and social services” (Gesetzblatt der DDR 1973; 
Rau 2016). 
The SED leadership expected that this “territorial cooperation” (territoriale 
Zusammenarbeit) would make investments and work flows more effective. As 
                                                             
18  „Entwicklung sozialistischer Kommunalpolitik auf Grundlage des Staatsratsbeschluss vom 
16.4.1970“ (Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz, 30413_2/6804). 
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such, it was intended that certain facilities be shared among several municipali-
ties at once. Similarly, it was intended that one municipality conduct road 
cleaning and repair work in numerous municipalities. It was expected that 
municipalities now act with a certain degree of autonomy. The notion that 
“local reserves” (örtliche Reserven) would be freed up evolved into a narrative 
that significantly influenced the behaviour of Bezirke, Kreise, cities and munic-
ipalities. Municipal politics was now equated with the politics of local services, 
aimed at fostering crafts, services, and cooperatives. This new politics was also 
associated with stimulating citizens’ engagement and freeing up local reserves. 
This idea that this particular instrument of municipal associations would al-
low the central government to task subordinate governance levels with imple-
menting its strategies is illustrated by the example of a ‘sharing of experiences’ 
among municipal associations in Karl-Marx-Stadt (today’s Chemnitz) in 1976. 
Heinz Arnold, Chairman of the Bezirk Council (Vorsitzender des Rates des 
Bezirkes), hence argued that working together was a means of increasing effi-
ciency and was “increasingly becoming an inseparable aspect of municipal 
politics.” The elements of cooperation and competition were emphasised as 
ways for improving the work of local bodies: comparing achievements and 
encouraging a “sharing of experiences” (Erfahrungsaustausch) among different 
municipalities and associations was intended to increase productivity and effi-
ciency. It was claimed that contributing to this territorial rationalisation was not 
an end in itself but a way to improve the local status-quo: 
This process guarantees that the social life in every city and municipality will 
flourish, that citizens’ political participation and initiatives in the context of 
participatory competitions (Mach-Mit-Wettbewerbe) will increase, and that 
varied cultural and sportive activities will develop.19 
Starting point and goal of this process, from the perspective of the East German 
leadership, was to improve and rationalise administrative procedures, and to 
focus resources and investments. The focused use of funds and capacities to-
wards the “harmonious development of settlements” was intended to not curtail 
the autonomy of citizens’ assemblies. The process sought to empower munici-
palities to fulfil their responsibilities and to support citizen initiatives, like for 
instance regarding “individual housing construction” or maintenance efforts 
(Kintzel 1988, 57-60). Practical problems and programmatic targets were af-
forded high priority. Accordingly, Chairman Arnold stressed the significance 
of the housing construction programme for the municipalities by noting that the 
SED central committee had declared “that until 1980 all cities and municipali-
ties must have improved living conditions through either modernising or build-
ing housing stock.” Given that the Bezirk insisted on a concerted maintenance 
and modernisation effort to “reconstruct old housing areas in Kreis and medi-
                                                             
19  „Gemeindeverbände 1976“ (Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz, 30413_2/14082). 
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um sized towns” using funds which had been planned and approved, the re-
maining cities and municipalities were forced to participate in the programme 
utilising their own resources. Local citizen initiatives, economic collectives and 
agricultural production cooperatives (LPGs) had to be directed to address the 
respective tasks accordingly: 
We are of the opinion that the councils must direct the after hour work brigades 
(Feierabendbrigaden) and retiree brigades (Rentnerbrigaden) in order to im-
plement the measures according to the order determined in the long-term plan.20 
Therefore, local bodies, from the perspective of central leadership, were not 
only responsible for realising programmes and measures determined by central 
leadership but simultaneously for improving local conditions. These processes 
were intended to be “linked to effective solutions to set targets, quick responses 
to everyday challenges, and to everyday problems. For this, potentials and 
reserves, as well as workers’ creative capacities, must be comprehensively 
utilised and mobilised.” According to Chairman Arnold, “ideological clarity 
and effective support from Kreis councils” would determine what shape these 
measures would take and whether they would be successful. 
Following this logic, local bodies alone held responsibility for realising cen-
trally determined targets using these new instruments of territorial reorganisa-
tion, along with their “creative labour” (schöpferische Umsetzung). Even 
though the political discourse regularly referred to local interests, obstinate 
practices and divergent strategies, which displayed too much self-will, were 
immediately halted on the local level (Lindenberger 1999, 2015). It was as-
sumed, yet again, that local interests had been integrated into and found expres-
sion through GDR state policies: 
Solutions to questions in the interest of citizens and pertaining to their every-
day lives, to life in villages, municipalities or cities must be found. Harnessing 
the advantages of socialism means achieving visible and tangible improve-
ments in the lives of the people through cooperative efforts and by mobilising 
all available reserves. This requirement is no excuse for ignoring state plans or 
the principle of democratic centralism. [sic! LK] Fulfilling the economic plans 
decided by the Kreis assembly (Kreistag) has priority. If this has been 
achieved and if additional material resources remain, then projects on the mu-
nicipal level can be realised.21 
Fulfilling the state’s plans remained paramount. Local projects could only be 
addressed if additional capacities could be mobilised. 
These municipal associations exemplify the state’s scalar tactic of delegat-
ing responsibility for territorial duties and local living conditions to subordinate 
levels (Kintzel 1985, 56). Kreise, cities, and municipalities functioned as a 
resource pool for the state’s social policies by proving building resources, 
                                                             
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. 
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utilising available infrastructure, and mobilising local reserves. However, 
Kreise, cities, and Gemeinden received neither additional resources nor powers 
to match these extra responsibilities. 
3.3  Illicit Construction Work (Schwarzbauten) 
Municipal associations were formed on the basis of a centralised plan to fulfil 
state goals. Yet subversive practices and unconventional approaches to address 
local issues also emerged, albeit without centralised state coordination. Illicit 
construction work that was undertaken in disregard of the official plan and 
instead in the interest of local actors, became surprisingly common and was 
often tolerated by the central leadership (Schneider 2001). The broad notion of 
“creative implementation” (schöpferische Umsetzung) was left deliberately 
vague by political leaders as to grant leeway to the local level, provided the (ill-
defined) general interest of the people was not undermined. Knowledge of and 
solutions to specific local problems were a prerogative of local administrations. 
This strategy was widespread throughout the GDR and also encompassed in-
formal negotiations as an element of the state’s planning system. Such informal 
negotiations gradually became institutionalised as an element of state rule. 
Illicit construction work matched functionaries’ notion of local responsibil-
ity, helped achieve partial improvements on the local level, and in this sense 
helped precariously stabilise the overall system. Again and again, it was made 
clear to local actors that, due to the GDR’s economic circumstances, not every-
thing could be realised. The parameters of the planned economy rendered many 
projects unfeasible. As such, local initiates became increasingly important for 
Bezirke, Kreise and municipalities. After all, projects codified in the state’s 
overall plan did not guarantee that all pressing issues would be resolved. Many 
urgent projects depended on the efforts of citizens, the administration and the 
economy to be realised. Consequently, local administrations grew more asser-
tive, taking on greater responsibilities and developing managerial skills on the 
regional level. On an intermediary level, local administrations began consider-
ing themselves problem-solving agents (Bahr 2016). 
In the following, three distinct types of illicit constructions will be dis-
cerned: 
1) Prestige projects, which were mostly initiated by high-ranking Bezirk func-
tionaries. Hospitals, hotels, and opera houses were built, cable cars modern-
ised, ministers and combine directors brought onboard, services bought from 
abroad, etc.; 
2) Mid-range projects such as renovating the external plaster of castle Augus-
tusburg. This brought together construction functionaries from the Bezirk 
and its Kreise to realise a project that was not part of the state plan with re-
sources provided by local cooperatives and partners; 
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3) Innumerable instances in which nursery schools were built, train stations 
were renovated, or city centres were spruced up by citizens and/or efforts of 
a municipality. These were genuine initiatives conducted in the context of 
competitions like “Making Cities and Municipalities beautiful” (Schöner 
unsere Städte und Gemeinden) and by after hour work brigades. 
Nevertheless, projects of this kind always bordered on illegality. This applied 
not just to after hour work brigades who were often paid and worked off the 
books. Likewise, citizens’ projects in support of their local municipality or 
efforts to build one’s own weekend house could violate existing laws and result 
in punishment.22 
Type 1: Representative projects in Bezirk capitals 
Looking back, Harry Mönch, Chairman of the Bezirk Council Frankfurt (Oder) 
emphasised that he succeeded in implementing several important projects for 
the Bezirk in the 1960s. Among them, building a hotel in the Bezirk town 
Frankfurt (Oder) and a hospital in Rüdersdorf, despite very little support from 
central leadership from the start. Even though his initiatives did not comply 
with administrative principles, it all worked out given that the regional level 
was expected to mobilise resources and show initiative. With the help of 
Mönch’s apparatus, experts, and networks, local projects were realised and 
approved. Mönch stated that “many things were achievable. We accomplished 
many things” and that the Bezirk held responsibility. In sum, Mönch noted that 
“we were in charge.”23 
Even Bezirke with an abundance of resources were confronted with projects 
that needed urgent attention. In the 1980s, the state’s plan did not entail the 
modernisation of the opera house and cable car leading to the skiing region in 
Karl-Marx-Stadt. When both objects fell into disrepair, Chairman of the Bezirk 
Council Lothar Fichtner established teams comprised of actors from the Bezirk 
and sympathetic functionaries from central leadership, who were able to obtain 
resources through unofficial channels, to tackle the necessary repairs.24 A major 
advantage consisted in the ability of leading functionaries from the Bezirk to 
tap into their political capital to draw on Kreise, cooperatives, and central ac-
tors to create project-based task forces and networks to address various goals.  
                                                             
22  „Schriftverkehr des Bezirksratsvorsitzenden mit den Vorsitzenden der Räte der Kreise und 
Stadtkreise und Oberbürgermeistern der Städte,“ 1968-9 (Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz 
30413/7210). 
23  Verbal statement by Harry Mönch, who chaired Bezirk Council Frankfurt (Oder) between 
1963 and 1969, on April 4, 2014. 
24  Verbal statement by Lothar Fichtner, Chairman of the Bezirk Council Karl-Marx-Stadt 
between 1981 and 1960, on April 21, 2015. 
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Type 2: Bezirk and Kreise 
Lothar Fichtner explained that he was able to gain the support of Kreis councils 
chairmen for projects of the Bezirk because he, in turn, backed initiatives dear 
to the Kreise. Under the auspices of the Bezirk, the façade of castle Augustus-
burg in Kreis Flöha was renovated, even though the plan did not call for this. 
The provision of scaffolding and workers was agreed upon at a meeting of 
Kreis construction directors (Kreisbaudirektoren), the Bezirk’s construction 
department (Bezirksbauamt), and other actors from the Bezirk. Initiatives like 
these hence depended on leading regional functionaries and administrative staff 
coming together to organise resources necessary for a project that had not been 
included in the state plan.25 
Within East German regional politics, projects like these had an ambivalent 
character. On the one hand, party and state leaders depended on the ability of 
functionaries on the level of Bezirke to take initiative of this kind. On the other 
hand, regional and local decision-makers had to refrain themselves from find-
ing too many additional construction resources as this would cause the state’s 
central planning department to suspect that materials were being withheld 
deliberately. 
Type 3: Municipalities (Gemeinden) 
Citizens and political representatives took matters into their own hands else-
where, too. In the village of Stützengrün, in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt, citizens 
met to establish an expert task force to build a gymnasium, which had been 
demanded for years. The village mayor had not been involved in this initiative. 
The Bezirk council, however, reigned in this otherwise acceptable initiative, 
integrating it into state structures. It was decided that the initiative should be 
planned with support of the Kreis and then agreed by the Kreis council or by 
the council of Kreis representatives. Chairman of the Bezirk Council Arnold 
stressed that the idea was not to oppose the citizenry but that initiatives had to 
adhere to the state’s framework and be subject to its control.26 
In March 1976, Kreis Hainichen assembly decided to address local griev-
ances, rather than merely adopt the economic plan, as was customary. Drawing 
inspiration from a campaign in Torgau, the assembly opted to add the creation 
of a nursery school for 72 children to the plan. This unexpected project could 
not be swiftly realised, however, as the building which was to host the nursery 
school was inhabited by numerous families. A replacement building for them 
was difficult to find, leading to the postponement of the ambitious nursery 
                                                             
25  „Schriftverkehr des Bezirksratsvorsitzenden“ 1968-9 (Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz, 
30413/7210). 
26  Ibid. 
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school project. This, in turn, provoked the ire of the Bezirk administration, 
causing the Kreis council representative to admit that “we learnt that only well-
prepared, scientifically grounded projects can be added to the plan and that 
spontaneous changes to the plan – no matter how well intentioned – will not be 
tolerated.” Several months later, the town mayor wrote to Arnold that the 
“much criticised nursery school” had now been built with support from “after 
hour work brigades and the citizenry.”27 
When state functionaries and leading economic cadres met in task forces, 
resources at the disposal of central leadership were concealed, mobilised, or 
diverted elsewhere. Looking back, Mönch and Fichtner emphasise that if noth-
ing had changed in their Bezirk, criticism would certainly have ensued. The 
central leadership expected problems to be solved. In fact, constructive efforts 
by council chairmen, which infringed against existing laws and contradicted 
the central economic plan and its procedures, later often earned praise instead 
of provoking punishment. Often such projects (like constructing or renovating 
hotels, hospitals, cable cars, opera houses, and nursery schools) were then 
inaugurated with central functionaries in attendance. 
One’s position within East Germany’s governance structure determined 
one’s options available to proactively realise such projects, as well as the re-
quirements one had to meet to do so. Often, what mattered most was an actor’s 
political capital, access to local networks and leading figures. Other examples 
illustrate that the strategy of “jumping scales” (Smith 2007) was successfully 
deployed to switch between different state levels to achieve specific aims. 
While illicitly constructed buildings were mostly built using informal channels, 
formal complaints (Eingaben) lodged by citizens or municipalities to East 
Germany’s highest committees often helped solve regional problems (Werner 
1996). Once central leadership had been alerted to an issue within a Kreis or 
Bezirk that was not being adequately addressed, this accelerated the problem-
solving process. It was for this reason that local actors deliberately opted for 
this instrument if issues dear to them were not being processed as desired via 
the usual administrative channels. 
                                                             
27  Ibid. 
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4.  Scalar Strategies in East German ‘Democratic 
Centralism’ 
4.1  Politics of Scale? Agency in Vertical Networks and 
Administrative Culture Instead of Self-Interest 
Local actors utilised networks to advance local interests. Assessing and situat-
ing such processes remains a matter of debate, however. In the debate on sca-
larity, Kevin Cox, for instance, has problematized the implications of “politics 
of scale.” He instead prefers the terms “networks of association” and “spaces of 
engagement,” which encompass several scales and premise a political model 
that is less compartmentalised in terms of space and scale (Cox 1998). His 
approach is helpful for grasping East Germany’s politics, as it questions the 
notion of compartmentalised political realms on the local, regional, and state 
levels. A more contemporary understanding of the GDR as a system wherein 
state interests were vertically integrated and where project-based networks 
existed illustrates that political agendas, political influence, and the shaping of 
state policy, planning, and administrative efforts were not by default confined 
to distinct scales or areas (Marston 2000, 226). 
Scalar tactics evolved within specific contexts. Programmes implemented by 
central leadership determining the duties of local bodies can be conceptualised 
as social constructs of subordinated state levels, as well as instances of politics 
of scale. Local tasks and instruments shaped actors’ self-image. Delegating 
responsibility to the local level for local affairs formed part of the state’s over-
all system of rule, serving as an effective means of integrating the local level 
into state governance. Spatially-oriented scalar strategies pursued by the local 
level were based on the demand and need for problem-solving capacities. It 
was not just a compartmentalised spatial and scalar orientation which deter-
mined goals, strategies, and practices. What mattered equally was the kind of 
political culture pervading the administration, which was marked by loyalty 
towards the socialist state (Kuhl 2016). While local authorities were concerned 
with their territory, seeking to solve local problems, they rarely questioned the 
legitimacy of the system at large. Instead, they were proud to contribute to 
small or far-reaching improvements under the given and accepted situation of 
resource scarcity. Regarding the tasks assigned to them, they enjoyed room for 
manoeuvre and various possibilities to improve their situations, something that 
was politically desired and intended to enable problem-solving on the local 
level. While they implemented central directives, local authorities – supported 
by networks and informal strategies – significantly contributed to East German 
urban development, which was framed by technological, economic, and widely 
acknowledged political parameters. 
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4.2  Structural Flaws as Limits to Scalar Compensation Efforts 
In the hierarchical GDR state structure, municipalities were subordinate to and 
bound by central directives, bearing the brunt when resources were withdrawn 
from them to serve greater political, economic, or social purposes. This meant 
that resources were no longer available for local projects. Nevertheless, admin-
istrators on the state and Bezirk level subscribed to the ideal that municipalities 
should be empowered. This scalar approach to politics is hence an example for 
“(inter)municipal learning processes, representing a precarious attempt to rec-
oncile supra-municipal challenges with the particular traits of various munici-
palities” (Luks 2014). Such attempts encompassed cooperative, divergent, and 
orchestrated strategies to tackle local issues, like forming municipal associa-
tions, sharing experiences, or holding competitions but also included engaging 
in more subversive or more informal practices.  
While such practices did occur, one should not underestimate the limits to 
local autonomy in East Germany. Local initiatives could not rely on unwaver-
ing political support and urban development programmes determined how 
much leeway was granted to them.28 Projects of great practical or symbolic 
importance could only be realised if specific conditions were met, and were 
dependent on local constellations and networks of individuals. 
Building housing stock had been afforded highest priority, leading to a 
withdrawal of state leadership from central and comprehensive structural pro-
grammes, granting greater responsibility to local bodies to realise the housing 
programme in Berlin and elsewhere on the local level. While it had been de-
clared that cities and municipalities would benefit equally from the housing 
programme, in reality resources were focused on political and economic cen-
tres in Bezirke and Kreise. This meant that some settlements and entire cities 
received no funds at all from the Bezirke or Kreis, forcing them to mobilise 
resources of their own to realise the housing programme. As such, centrally 
instigated programmes often depended on tapping into and straining local re-
sources. In addition, centrally instigated programmes constituted the defining 
frameworks for all construction efforts and could not be offset through local 
initiatives. 
By the shift of responsibility for local affairs to local bodies, the state sys-
tematically devalued local interests, as demands to realise local needs now 
could no longer be directed to superior authorities. Specifically, this devalua-
tion of local interests consisted in the assumption that local interest should be 
met though the actions of local actors themselves. This increased responsibility 
was not, however, accompanied by reduced economic planning and fewer 
demands vis-a-vis subordinate levels. Rather, this merely implied that centrally 
                                                             
28  Verbal statement by Karl Joachim Beuchel, city architect in Karl-Marx-Stadt from 1974 to 
1984, on April 28, 2015. 
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instigated programmes had to be implemented by subordinate levels at their 
own cost. 
4.3  Chains of Command and Precarious Rooms for Manoeuvre 
Against the backdrop of the precarious stability of the East German system, 
this article examined organisational models, practices, and limits to administra-
tive action and planning in the GDR’s vertically integrated governance struc-
ture. Central and peripheral actors’ scalar strategies played an ambivalent role 
within this system: scalar tactics on the regional level simultaneously contrib-
uted to and undermined the stability of the overall system. 
An approach that takes into consideration the interplay of different scales 
can methodically account for particular interests on the local level, efforts to 
increase participation, and mechanisms for generating legitimacy within East 
Germany’s socialist polity. Informal strategies, the practice of ‘jumping scales’ 
and partial autonomy granted to the local authorities afforded some room for 
manoeuvre to subordinate levels. Scalar tactics pursued by subordinate levels 
yielded a certain leeway that often matched the interests of central leadership. 
Likewise, the state’s scalar tactics were also successful, if to a lesser extent, as 
its interests partially overlapped with those of the lower levels. Contrasting 
points of departure do not account for the success of scalar tactics. Instead, 
influence gained though scalar tactics is better understood as the result of 
matching interests and productive negotiations within a scalar system that 
retained the ability to integrate different elements on the basis of shared politi-
cal values and basic tenets. Thus, networks and scalar tactics can be understood 
not just as manifestations of particular interests but also as integral elements of 
East German governance. Networks and scalar tactics constituted an element of 
administrative culture, conformed to the notion of collective socialist work, and 
reflected the functionaries’ understanding of their own function in the adminis-
trative system. 
Scalar tactics were pursued within and outside of the GDR’s command 
economy. Such top-down and bottom-up impulses were of a dynamic nature. 
Local problem-solving capacities lacked a stable framework, however: On the 
one hand, such capacities were supported by the higher echelons of political 
leadership. On the other hand, they were achieved on the local level by deliber-
ately acting counter to the official economic plan and political procedures. 
Nonetheless, one cannot attest a strategic shifting of power towards the local 
level. Mid-level institutions remained bound to programmes, laws and concepts 
decided by central leadership (Werner 2015). 
Regional practices and networks were able to address many problems in an 
assertive and semi-independent manner. This partial autonomy was only of 
limited use, however, as all initiatives had to conform to predetermined politi-
cal programmes. They influenced matters of communication and determined 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  264 
how everyday political matters were understood. The notion that planning was 
based on rational considerations strengthened the political power of the leader-
ship vis-a-vis subordinate institutions. The SED’s official stance carried tre-
mendous weight – very little influence was granted to experts or local politi-
cians to influence how the country should be ruled, how the economy should be 
run, and how citizens should lead their ordinary lives. Demonstrating unity did 
little to stabilise the system of rule in the long-term. Subsystems were restricted 
to realising state targets in various ways. Innovative approaches and fundamen-
tal improvements, however, would have required an open, honest, and radical 
exchange of opinions, as well as the willingness to engage with dissenting 
views. 
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